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The Future of Value-Based Payment: A Road Map to 2030
Abstract
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A decade after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the vision of moving the U.S. health care system
“from volume to value” has been partially realized, with few value-based payment initiatives
systematically reducing spending or improving quality. While participation in value-based payments
continues to grow, the adoption of advanced forms of value-based payment through alternative payment
models lags behind both the goals set by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 2015 and the
threshold required for widespread practice transformation. Furthermore, the complexity of the current
suite of alternative payment models and allure of traditional fee-for-service prevent the widespread
adoption of full risk-bearing contracts. The high costs of care with the impending insolvency of the
Medicare trust fund, persistence of poor quality of care and health disparities along racial and
socioeconomic lines, and mixed success of alternative payment models indicate the need for a revamped
vision for the 2020s.
The 2020s require a new strategy that moves from a short-term focus on testing new payment models to
a long-term focus on expanding models that are most likely to generate substantial savings and improve
quality. This white paper outlines a new direction for the federal government—primarily through the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—to chart over the next decade aimed at completing
the transition to a health care system that pays for value and reduced health disparities, rather than high
volumes of services.
First, CMS must articulate a clear vision for the future of value-based payment. In particular, the vision
must align across all publicly financed health care, driving change beyond Medicare and Medicaid.
Second, CMS must dramatically simplify the current value-based payment landscape and engage lateadopting providers. Third, for health systems already participating in value-based payment, CMS must
accelerate the movement from upside-only shared savings to risk-bearing, population-based alternative
payment models while curtailing the ability of providers to opt out of value-based payment altogether.
Fourth, CMS must not only pull providers toward advanced alternative payment models, but also structure
incentives to push providers away from fee-for-service payment. Finally, achieving health equity must be a
central feature and goal of value-based payment. Taken together, these five recommendations provide a
path toward widespread adoption and success of alternative payment models, producing better health
outcomes for all Americans, reducing wasteful inefficiencies and health disparities, and more effectively
stewarding taxpayer funds to support other national priorities
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Key Terms
Fee-for-service
Value-based payment
Alternative payment
models (APMs)
Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs)

Bundled payments
Comprehensive Payment
for Primary Care

Negotiated or pre-specified unit prices for services, without any regard to quality
or value.
Payment (fee-for-service or otherwise) with some linkage to quality, value, or
infrastructure.
Advanced forms of value-based payment, in which providers take on substantial
financial risk to deliver high-quality care at lower cost.
An APM in which groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers
are responsible for total cost of care for a population of Medicare beneficiaries. If
total spending is below a pre-set benchmark and quality remains stable,
providers share in the savings. In some tracks, ACOs may pay losses to Medicare
if spending exceeds benchmarks.
An APM in which doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers are paid a
fixed price for an episode of care. Providers must cover costs above the target
price, including those from complications and readmissions. Providers share in
the savings if they keep costs below the target price while maintaining quality.
A primary care APM in which practices receive care management fees,
performance-based incentive payments, and, in some cases, lump sum quarterly
payments for total allowed charges.

The Future of Value-Based Payment: A Road Map to 2030
Executive Summary
A decade after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the vision of moving the U.S. health care system “from
volume to value” has been partially realized, with few value-based payment initiatives systematically reducing
spending or improving quality. While participation in value-based payments continues to grow, the adoption of
advanced forms of value-based payment through alternative payment models lags behind both the goals set by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 2015 and the threshold required for widespread practice
transformation. Furthermore, the complexity of the current suite of alternative payment models and allure of
traditional fee-for-service prevent the widespread adoption of full risk-bearing contracts. The high costs of care
with the impending insolvency of the Medicare trust fund, persistence of poor quality of care and health
disparities along racial and socioeconomic lines, and mixed success of alternative payment models indicate the
need for a revamped vision for the 2020s.
The 2020s require a new strategy that moves from a short-term focus on testing new payment models to a
long-term focus on expanding models that are most likely to generate substantial savings and improve quality.
This white paper outlines a new direction for the federal government—primarily through the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—to chart over the next decade aimed at completing the transition to a
health care system that pays for value and reduced health disparities, rather than high volumes of services.
First, CMS must articulate a clear vision for the future of value-based payment. In particular, the vision must
align across all publicly financed health care, driving change beyond Medicare and Medicaid. Second, CMS
must dramatically simplify the current value-based payment landscape and engage late-adopting providers.
Third, for health systems already participating in value-based payment, CMS must accelerate the movement
from upside-only shared savings to risk-bearing, population-based alternative payment models while curtailing
the ability of providers to opt out of value-based payment altogether. Fourth, CMS must not only pull
providers toward advanced alternative payment models, but also structure incentives to push providers away
from fee-for-service payment. Finally, achieving health equity must be a central feature and goal of valuebased payment. Taken together, these five recommendations provide a path toward widespread adoption and
success of alternative payment models, producing better health outcomes for all Americans, reducing wasteful
inefficiencies and health disparities, and more effectively stewarding taxpayer funds to support other national
priorities.

1

Introduction: A Decade of Movement from Volume to Value
Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) has sought to transform U.S. health care from a system that incentivizes volume to one that rewards
value. A key part of this strategy has been shifting from fee-for-service (FFS) payment to mechanisms that link
provider reimbursement to improved quality and reduced costs. In 2015, Health and Human Services (HHS)
Secretary Sylvia Burwell publicly committed CMS to tying at least 90% of traditional Medicare fee-for-service
payments to quality by 2018.1
However, simply adding bonuses and penalties to fee-for-service payments is not enough to transform a
system with historically high prices and inefficient care processes. Therefore, CMS has also developed
advanced alternative payment models (APMs) that hold providers financially accountable for the quality and
cost of care delivered to patients. These APMs include accountable care organizations (ACOs), episodebased payment models, Comprehensive Primary Care models, and other arrangements. Beyond committing to
tying 90% of traditional Medicare fee-for-service payments to quality, CMS also sought to have at least half of
payments flowing through APMs by 2018. According to the latest available data, while CMS has successfully
tied 90% of payments to value, only about 40% flowed through APMs.2
However, the transition to a health care system that rewards value has slowed in recent years, and the promise
of curtailing health care spending while also improving quality has remained elusive. Indeed, quality of care
remains variable across health care settings with ongoing unnecessary utilization, low rates of compliance with
recommended care, and inequities in health and health care. Meanwhile, though per-beneficiary spending
growth in Medicare and Medicaid has slowed, aggregate spending continues to rise due to the aging
population and expanded program eligibility. This will ultimately result in increasing per-enrollee costs3 and will
contribute to the expected insolvency of the Medicare Trust Fund in 2024. In addition, without increased
adoption of alternative payment models into the commercial market, where per-enrollee costs continue to
outstrip inflation and wage growth, health care spending will continue to grow.4 The combination of quality and
fiscal concerns require renewed focus on improving the value of health care for all Americans.
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A Decade of Innovation
The 2010s produced many value-based programs, including Medicare’s flagship Shared Savings Program
(MSSP) ACOs established under the ACA. Others were established through regulation, primarily by CMS’s
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), which has developed and tested dozens of alternative
payment models. Commercial payers have followed Medicare’s lead, launching APMs with tailored episode
and population-based models. After a decade of innovation, it is time to take stock of how successful these
efforts have been in transforming health care payment and delivery.

Where We Are Now: Adoption of Value-Based Payment
The wide variety of current payment models may be categorized along a continuum, from legacy fee-forservice to global capitated payment. The Health Care Payment Learning & Action Network (HCP-LAN)
defines four broad categories of payment (adapted in Table 1).2 Efforts to promote value-based payment focus
on moving as many providers and as much revenue as possible to the third and fourth categories.
Table 1. Provider Payment Types, Adapted From HCP-LAN
Definition

Example

Category 1

Fee-for-service with no link to quality or
value

Physician professional fees

Category 2

Fee-for-service linked to quality and value

Category 3

Alternative payment models built on a feefor-service architecture that hold providers
financially accountable for performance

Category 4

Alternative payment models using
population-based payment, with
safeguards against limiting necessary care

Pay-for-performance (e.g., MIPS) and
infrastructure improvement payments
Shared savings (e.g., MSSP ACOs)
Episode-based payments for procedures (e.g.,
BPCI)
Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+) Track 1
Global capitated budgets (e.g., integrated delivery
systems)
Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+) Track 2
Prospective bundled payments for chronic
conditions

In 2018, fee-for-service with no link to quality or value still accounted for nearly 40% of all insurer payments,
and the majority of payments in Medicaid and commercial insurance (Table 2). Medicare and Medicare
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Advantage have had more success in moving away from fee-for-service, although just a small fraction of these
payments is in APMs with population-based payments.
Table 2. Share of Payments Made, by Payer and Payment Category (2018)
Fee-for-service, not
linked to quality or
value

Fee-for-service,
linked to quality or
value

APMs built on fee-forservice architecture

APMs using
population-based
payment

Overall

39.1%

25.1%

30.7%

5.1%

Medicare

10.2%

48.9%

36.5%

4.4%

Medicare
Advantage

39.5%

6.9%

36.4%

17.2%

Medicaid

66.1%

10.6%

17.4%

5.9%

Commercial

55.7%

14.2%

27.6%

2.5%

Furthermore, progress remains uneven across providers, geographic areas, and different APMs. In Medicare,
most provider participation in population-based models is concentrated in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program (MSSP). In 2020, roughly 500 MSSP ACOs served over 11 million Medicare beneficiaries (about 20%
of all enrollees). MSSP participation is lower in many southern states and rural areas more broadly (Figure 1).
While patients in ACOs tend to have a higher clinical risk, providers in communities serving populations with
social risk factors are less likely to participate in ACOs.5, 6 This may be, in part, because care for populations
with high social risk is typically concentrated within a subset of providers, such as Federally Qualified Health
Centers (FQHCs). More troublingly, some ACO models may emphasize reducing wasteful utilization, but for
many populations the primary problem is under-utilization and underspending.
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Figure 1. Percent of Medicare Population in an ACO by Hospital Referral Region (2019)

“Spread of ACOs And Value-Based Payment Models In 2019: Gauging the Impact of Pathways to Success,”
Health Affairs Blog, October 21, 2019. DOI: 10.1377/hblog20191020.962600
Similarly, most episode-based payment in Medicare is concentrated in the Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement (BPCI) Advanced program. In the first performance year of BPCI Advanced (2018-2019), 22% of
eligible hospitals and 23% of eligible clinicians participated in the program, which paid for 16% of potential
episodes. While these adoption rates were higher than the previous iterations of BPCI, most hospitals that
expressed interest did not ultimately enroll. BPCI Advanced hospitals were more likely to be urban, larger, and
non-profit.7 Therefore, to the extent there are improvements in quality or efficiency, patients in rural areas with
smaller health systems may be left behind.
While adoption of APMs has increased over time, many clinicians remain suspicious and hesitant to participate
in any value-based payment.8 Most providers who do participate in value-based payment choose arrangements
without downside financial risk, rather than making the jump to advanced APMs. In 2020, 37% of Medicare
MSSP ACOs took on downside risk, up from less than 10% in 2017.9, 10 In 2021, 41% of MSSP ACOs appear to
be taking on downside risk, but the number of program participants and attributed beneficiaries has declined.9,11

5

Where We Are Now: Efficacy of Value-Based Payment and Health
Disparities
The past decade of experimentation with APMs has had successes and failures. But it has provided proof-ofconcept that if designed well, APMs are capable of driving cost savings and value improvements. There have
been notable successes with the more advanced models that shift greater accountability onto providers,
particularly those that do so over longer time horizons. Critics of value-based payment argue the movement is
largely a disappointment, with only a small number reducing costs for Medicare, and many generating
substantial losses.12 Observers are right to note that the current APM landscape includes many
underperforming models, which have failed to produce the desired practice transformation. However, a decade
of middling results does not imply that CMS should abandon value-based payment. The decade of
experimentation has produced the necessary knowledge to design and implement APMs to transform health
care delivery. We must build upon the most successful APMs and phase out those that have not delivered on
their promise.
To date, the savings and quality gains from alternative payment models have been inconsistent and modest
(Table 3).13-24 Bundled payment models have produced modest per-episode savings for surgical procedures,
most notably lower extremity joint replacements. Bundled payments have produced smaller savings for select
medical conditions, such as congestive heart failure, and no savings for other conditions, such as cancer and
acute myocardial infarctions. There is no clear evidence of improvements to health equity.
Table 3. Broad State of Evidence from Alternative Payment Models
Program Type
Accountable
Care
Organizations
(Medicare Shared
Savings Program)

Cost
Gross savings of 1% to 4%,
increasing as years in ACO
increase.
Net savings to Medicare of <1%
per beneficiary after paying out
shared savings

Quality
Modest
improvements in
several quality
dimensions, e.g.,
readmissions, patient
experience, and care
coordination.

Equity
Providers in communities
serving low-income and
minority populations less
likely to participate.

Bundled
Payments
(Medicare
Bundled
Payments for
Care
Improvement and

Varies by condition and
procedure.

Varies by condition
and procedure.

1.5-2% per-episode gross savings
for some surgical episodes (e.g.,
hip and knee replacements), but

Some evidence of
improved functional
status, no change in
mortality,

Hospitals caring for
vulnerable groups less likely
to receive shared savings.
Some data suggesting
populations with social risk
factors not harmed.
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Mixed evidence of riskselection.

Comprehensive
Care for Joint
Replacement)

no net savings to Medicare after
paying bonuses.

readmissions, or
patient satisfaction.

Comprehensive
Primary Care
Programs (CPC
and CPCI+)
Medicare
Advantage

No savings to Medicare.

Some evidence of
improved quality and
reduced ED use

Practices located in
wealthier, highly educated
areas are more likely to join.

Some evidence Medicare
Advantage has lower perbeneficiary spending, but
Medicare payments to Medicare
Advantage plans remain high.

Evidence of improved
quality and reduced
utilization.

Mixed evidence. Racial
minorities may have
improved access to
screening under Medicare
Advantage, but other
evidence shows higher
readmission rates.

Smaller savings for some medical
conditions (e.g., congestive heart
failure), with no savings for others
(e.g., oncology).

Population-based ACOs have generated modest per-beneficiary savings, with improvements along several
quality dimensions. Evaluations suggest that physician-led ACOs have produced greater savings than hospitalled ACOs by reducing hospitalizations, and these savings increase the longer participants remain in the
program. Hospital-led ACOs face conflicting incentives: lost admission revenues wipe out the shared savings
earned through reducing hospitalizations. Therefore, hospital-led ACOs have focused on reducing post-acute
care spending. While models targeting high-cost populations (e.g., those with end-stage renal disease) have
generated the most savings, some evidence suggests that this is attributable to risk selection and regression to
the mean. While evidence suggests some forms of commercial and Medicaid ACOs can reduce cost and
improve quality, overall, there is much less evidence related to commercial and Medicaid ACOs.25, 26
With a small number of exceptions, value-based payment has yet to improve (or even explicitly address) access
to care or health outcomes for populations with social risk factors, including racial and ethnic minorities, rural
populations, and individuals with disabilities. Despite a growing recognition of these health care disparities, they
persist across all payers. In most cases, CMS has focused on monitoring the unintended effects of value-based
payment among populations with social risk factors. But the persistence of health inequities and disparities
indicate systemic bias and underperformance in the health care system, and value-based payment must address
those issues as key drivers of access and quality. To achieve health equity, value-based payment must directly
address systemic racism. It must also increase its focus on measuring racial disparities and linking those data
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with financial outcomes. The COVID-19 pandemic’s disproportionate impact on low-income and minority
communities underscores the need to make equity a core focus of value-based payment.

Challenges Remain for the Future of Value-Based Payment
What have we learned from this decade of innovation? While the last decade of APM experimentation includes
both successes and failures, there are some lessons about what works. Some bundled-payment programs and
ACOs have proven capable of reducing costs and improving the value of care delivered. Programs that use
two-sided risk (i.e., shared savings and losses) appear to have the greatest impact.27 Successful value-based
payment transitions take time; the savings and practice transformations from APMs take years of experience
and investment to pay off.24 For independent physician groups and providers unwilling to take on value-based
payment on their own, conveners with greater risk appetite and experience in value-based payment may be
useful shepherds.
Underperforming models yield important insights. For example, alternative payment models must focus on
optimizing shared decision-making tools and health IT infrastructure. Generous fee-for-service payment blunts
the adoption of and effect of APMs, and federal efforts to reduce the draw of fee-for-service have so far been
underpowered for the task. Therefore, the next decade of payment transformation must focus on expanding
the most effective APMs that utilize two-sided risk, engaging more providers, and retaining current APM
participants while graduating them to high-powered programs.
There are several challenges to these goals. The extensive administrative complexity of the value-based
payment landscape remains a significant barrier to participating in APMs and to evaluating each model.
Traditional fee-for-service remains alluringly profitable for providers, creating ambivalence for those weighing
the tradeoffs of investing in traditional vs. risk-bearing business models and enabling late adopters to “wait out”
payer interest in APMs. Many providers on the road to value-based payment seem unable or unwilling to make
the transition from upside risk-only to fully accountable care. Advanced models have not been developed or
implemented with a focus on health equity. Going forward, CMS must confront these challenges with a
cohesive strategy to improve APM performance and accelerate the use of advanced APMs.
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Goals for the 2020s: Articulate a Clear Vision for the Future of
Value-Based Payment Across All Publicly Financed Health Care
Over the past decade, CMS and CMMI have focused on experimentation, generating dozens of alternative
payment models with hundreds of tracks. It is time for CMS to lead with a strategic vision for the U.S. health
care system and a publicly available path to executing that vision, as well as a carefully managed,
straightforward, and sustainable APM portfolio.

The Case for an Overarching Framework
Excess experimentation has costs. Many APMs overlap both at the provider and beneficiary level, sometimes
competing with each other. For providers not yet engaged in any value-based payment, the increasingly
complex APM landscape dissuades adoption. Complexity encourages providers to chase small pools of shared
savings, rather than systematically transform their practice. Overlapping models make it difficult to parse
individual model effects on cost and quality, frustrating efforts to identify and expand the highest-performing
models. With little guidance on the types of value-based models CMS will sustain over the long term, health
systems are unsure of how to invest for optimal transformation and return on investment. Over the next
decade, providers need guidance and assistance, not experiments. Instead of a narrow focus on individual
models, CMS must begin to evaluate regularly the effect of the whole APM portfolio against expectations,
within a guiding framework.

A Proposed Path Forward
CMS must articulate a vision for health care delivery and payment for 2030 that includes a long-term plan for
the evolution of APMs, the coordination of models’ financial designs, and mandatory participation that moves
to eliminate risk-free fee-for-service arrangements. A clear strategy and set of goals would allow CMS to slow
the introduction of new models, evaluate the projected and observed performance of existing models, and
phase out underperforming initiatives. The framework should map different models to provider types (e.g.,
health systems, specialists, and primary care groups, as shown in Figure 2).
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Figure 2. An Example CMS Framework for the U.S. Health Care System

“Medicare Payment Reform’s Next Decade: A Strategic Plan For The Center For Medicare And Medicaid
Innovation,” Health Affairs Blog, December 18, 2020. DOI: 10.1377/hblog20201216.672904
As illustrated above, for prospectively attributed beneficiaries, groups of providers could be accountable for
total cost of care (through population-based payment via a health system, an ACO, or another convener), with
procedure-based specialists paid through bundled payments. Primary care providers could be paid under
advanced primary care models that include capitated fees for care management activities. Benchmarks for
episode and populated-based payment could be based on average costs in a market, rather than on each
provider’s past performance. Mandatory population-based payments would be the linchpin of this strategy,
because they can mitigate risk selection and promote care coordination.
Improving model performance will likely require provider competition at the market level, which in turn
demands substantial reforms to performance benchmarking. The current approach to generating cost and
quality baselines uses historical provider performance, with regular re-balancing. This mechanism generates a
“race to the bottom” and penalizes providers that were already efficient. In contrast, setting performance
baselines based on regional trends generates stronger incentives for practice transformation with transparent
goals. However, regional benchmarking is only possible if CMS puts a greater emphasis on mandatory
programs to generate an even playing field.
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CMS Needs to Manage Its Portfolio Strategically
To support its strategic vision, CMS should bring a portfolio-based approach to its value-based payment
initiatives. The portfolio approach treats new payment models as a series of investments across APM programs,
with specific allotments based on desired high-level goals, such as reducing per-beneficiary costs, improving
value, and addressing health equity. Such a division of investments would guide how CMS allocates resources
and measures success. The benefits to a long-term portfolio approach are manifold. First, a long-term
commitment to a specific set of investments helps guard against shifting political goals. Second, it provides
clarity to providers about the types of value-based program initiatives that are most suitable for investment.
Finally, it allows for a clear accounting of success and failures in value-based payment, separating wheat from
chaff.
As an illustration, CMS could allot 40% of its APM portfolio (measured either in investment dollars or number
of participating providers or beneficiaries) to a selection of models that are most likely to produce significant
value improvements and 30% to programs aimed at improving outcomes for populations with social risk factors.
A fifth of the portfolio could focus on novel experiments that are not payment models, but can still yield
savings (e.g., addressing prescription drug costs). A tenth of the portfolio could aim to reduce out-of-pocket
costs. Furthermore, health equity should be considered across all portfolio areas. Such a pre-determined
allocation would work in parallel with the larger strategic vision for national practice transformation, and it could
be adapted based on the evolution of evidence for APMs.

Goals for the 2020s: Simplify the Value-Based Payment Landscape,
Reduce Administrative Barriers for Late-Adopters, and Graduate
Providers to Advanced Risk-Bearing Arrangements
Accelerating the transition to value-based payment requires both drawing in late adopters and moving current
program participants to higher-risk APM contracts. To expand and entrench APMs, CMS must focus on
aligning APMs across payers, simplifying the administration of APMs, reforming the way performance
benchmarks are set, requiring participation in APMs when possible, and reducing the appeal of traditional feefor-service when it is not.

Pulling Providers in Through Alignment of APM Goals Across Payers
Adoption and coordination of APMs across payers would have significant benefits by increasing providers’ total
share of revenue flowing through APMs, thus creating a stronger business case for accelerating practice
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transformation. However, HHS has not adequately promoted APM adoption beyond Medicare. Over the next
decade, policymakers should promote national transformation and alignment by leveraging the full range of
federally funded health care programs.
The private sector accounts for the largest share of national health care spending due to its high
reimbursement rates. However, as shown in Table 2, commercial insurers have been slow to shift to value-based
payment. For APMs to be successful, they must be aligned and harmonized across payers, service lines, and
health plans. The federal government and CMS can lead this movement by aligning value-based payment in
public programs with those in private programs that receive federal subsidies. This includes Medicare,
TRICARE, the Veterans Health Administration, the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, commercial
plans sold on ACA exchanges, Medicaid, and managed care in both Medicare and Medicaid. For example,
HHS should require that insurance plans sold on the ACA exchanges commit to similar APM adoption and
structure as Medicare in order to draw premium subsidies. Similarly, Medicaid managed care organizations
must use APMs in order to draw federal funds, and Medicare Advantage bids should be contingent on a
meaningful percentage of the plan’s provider network participating in APMs.
While the government may move many payers in similar directions, it must balance harmonization with being
overly prescriptive. Medicaid, Medicare, and commercial insurance markets serve different populations, which
may require different spending priorities and quality metrics. Aligning goals across programs should be flexible
enough to allow these differences to emerge within a specified payment structure. However, aligning goals for
APMs should not further entrench inequities by taking as a given that quality outcomes should be worse for
populations with high social risks. Therefore, CMS should spearhead the development of multi-stakeholder
standards, with template models (e.g., surgical bundles and capitated primary care programs) and adaptations
for different populations, setting realistic goals without entrenching current inequities. Where appropriate, it
should promote state or regional multi-payer models that can push providers in a coordinated direction. The
overall goal is to increase the share of revenue tied to quality past the point of no return, which requires
commercial buy-in.

Pulling Providers in Through Administrative Simplification
CMS must also simplify the administrative burden of alternative payment models. As noted, regional
benchmarking can achieve substantial simplification for providers. Additionally, APMs must lock in providers
with more attractive multi-year commitments. Annual recommitments to APMs can result in substantial churn
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of providers participating in APMs and beneficiaries attributed to APMs, creating few incentives for providers
to make long-term investments in efficiency. In contrast, long-term contracts—such as five-year agreements—
signal a commitment to program success from CMS, and encourage providers to make greater technical and
programmatic investments in early years, with expected savings accruing in later years. Long-term contracts
should include multi-year beneficiary attribution—unless beneficiaries opt out or move—which allows providers
to cement care relationships and truly reap the returns on care management investments. Along with long-term
contracts and mandatory participation, CMS should prioritize identifying and implementing technical changes
to the structure of APMs to facilitate model adoption (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Sample Technical Simplifications for APM Providers
•

Link directly to provider EMRs, allowing for:
o Automated risk adjustment by pulling directly from technical
documentation (e.g., lab results)
o Automation of prior authorization requirements
o Removal of manual risk coding
o Automated care protocol submission

•

Provide technical assistance to upgrade and integrate EMRs

Pulling Providers in Through Mandatory Participation in APMs
CMS must move away from voluntary provider participation in APMs, and work with providers and conveners
to implement mandatory participation whenever feasible. The last decade has demonstrated bipartisan support
for many mandatory programs, which have at least four advantages. First, mandatory participation simplifies
the adoption of new payment models for providers and produces fair competition when benchmarks are set at
the regional level. Second, mandatory programs mitigate undesirable dynamics that occur when markets
segment into value-based and fee-for-service providers, such as risk selection of patients by providers
participating in APMs. Third, they are the most efficient way to bring in late adopters. Finally, they allow for
better control over evaluation, which in turn produces robust results, allowing the best versions of models to
emerge and diffuse more rapidly.
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Pulling Providers in by Reducing the Draw of Fee-for-Service
In some cases, requiring participation in APMs is not possible. In those cases, increasing the voluntary adoption
of risk-bearing APMs requires reducing the attractiveness of fee-for-service arrangements. First, CMS must reevaluate the current physician fee schedule, which is biased towards procedures, overvalues several specialty
procedure codes, and undervalues primary care. CMS must reprice the most used billing codes based on value,
adjusting payments based on actual work time as documented in established research. CMS must also
rebalance fees paid for inpatient hospital diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and medical supplies (e.g., oxygen
and blood).
The impact of these reforms would reverberate throughout the private market.
Negotiations between commercial payers and providers use CMS fees as a reference point, often reflecting
Medicare fees with relative multipliers. Therefore, rebalancing the CMS fee schedule will not only pull
providers to APMs within Medicare, but it will also improve the capacity of private payers to engage in APMs
with health systems and physicians.
CMS can also leverage consumer demand to reduce the attractiveness of fee-for-service, driving beneficiaries
to providers participating in APMs, and, more importantly, to high-performing providers. For example, CMS
could offer greater flexibility for telehealth waivers for providers in APMs and reduce patient cost-sharing for
specialists who utilized bundled payments. These mechanisms would discourage continued reliance on
traditional fee-for-service by making voluntary participation in APMs more economically attractive, which will
encourage broad practice transformation.

Goals for the 2020s: Value-Based Payment Focused on Equity and
Populations with Social Risk Factors
Far too often, the design of value-based contracts fails to account for health inequities or the possible effects of
value-based payment on health disparities. With a few exceptions, such as the ACO Investment Model, most
alternative payment models do not have an explicit goal of reducing health disparities. As a result, APMs may
penalize practices if they care for patients with high social risk. Rather than targeting health equity, health
disparities are considered as an afterthought in the evaluation, with monitoring to make sure spending
reductions and quality improvement do not inadvertently worsen access and care of populations with social risk
factors. Going forward, APMs should proactively promote equity with design decisions that treat reducing
disparities as a priority.
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Improving Health Equity is a Goal of Value-Based Payment
Several mechanisms can tie alternative payment models to health equity. In most cases, APMs can include
explicit, direct funding that targets the care of populations with social risk factors, including funding for
community health workers, community-based services, and teams that integrate health and social services.
APMs can require participants to screen for social risk factors, track those data in electronic health records, and
address those risk factors. Stratifying outcomes by race or other sources of social risk would allow CMS to tie
shared savings bonuses to reducing disparities, publicly reporting those data and rewarding providers that close
gaps. Consistently implementing these types of reforms across APMs in Medicare, Medicaid, and ACA
exchange plans would offer providers a meaningful business case for addressing disparities.
In addition to specific financial incentives, there are also several non-financial policies CMS can put in place to
address health equity. For example, Medicare and other federal payers can require that ACOs produce equity
impact statements that outline the current state of health equity in the beneficiary population, and how the
ACO plans to reduce disparities in outcomes for populations with social risk factors. Impact statements should
include measurable goals, clear metrics for success, and a commitment to making this information publicly
available. CMS should also improve its approach to measuring social risk, which may require intra-agency
coordination to develop new standards for data collection and measure definitions. Furthermore, CMS must
lead the development of validated measures of health equity, which are scarce. Finally, all publicly reported
patient outcomes, such as readmission rates, should be stratified by social risk factors. These reforms would also
reduce the likelihood that providers in APMs might avoid caring for populations with social risk factors.

Integrating Social Services into Health Care Delivery, With a Focus on Medicaid
Ultimately, patients’ outcomes are influenced by more factors beyond health care services. Unstable housing,
food insecurity, limited educational attainment, and poverty drive poor health outcomes. Policymakers can use
APMs and the full suite of federally financed health care to encourage providers to integrate health care
delivery with social services that address needed housing, food, and transportation, whether delivered by states,
the federal government, or independent non-profits.
Thus far, CMS has taken a limited approach to addressing social determinants of health, such as allowing
Medicare Advantage plans to pay for food and transportation services. Over the next decade, across all APMs,
CMS must explicitly require providers to connect beneficiaries to other social support programs for which they
are eligible and provide guidance and funding for APMs to close gaps related to social determinants of health.
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The largest opportunity to do so lies in Medicaid, but these efforts should not be limited to Medicaid. CMS
should provide clear guidance that allows Medicare, Medicaid (beyond the use of waivers), and Medicaid
managed care organizations to spend federal funding on social supports—either directly or through contracted
agreements with social service providers—and to include capitated payment to providers for care management
activities.
Allowing for greater spending on social supports through federal insurance will also require greater
accountability. Specifically, Medicaid must become a one-stop shop for all means-tested social welfare
programs. Federal funding for state Medicaid programs and Medicaid managed care organizations should be
contingent on actively enrolling beneficiaries and their dependents in other programs for which they qualify,
such as housing vouchers, supplemental nutrition assistance (SNAP), or Head Start. CMS should provide
technical assistance to states to implement and support these efforts.

Conclusion
In the decade since the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the health care system has reached a series of
important milestones in its shift to paying for value. Led by CMS, a growing share of payers have moved away
from outmoded fee-for-service payment. More providers than ever before are engaged in some form of
quality-linked payment, and a smaller cadre have begun experimenting with advanced forms of populationbased payment and large-scale practice transformation.
We now need a more focused, whole-of-government push toward a high-quality, efficient system. The
persistence of health disparities, uneven quality, and continued rise of health care costs, and the concomitant
threat to federal and state budgets, requires renewed focus on spreading the adoption of advanced forms of
alternative payment models. These models must move from experimentation to an entrenched, nationwide
standard.
The past decade of experimentation shows that alternative payment models as currently implemented are not
driving large-scale, systemic change. But a careful study of the lessons from both successful and
underperforming models suggests that properly designed APMs can yield improvements in value through cost
reductions and quality improvements. The next decade must put those lessons into practice by engaging late
adopters, ramping up already adopted and successful APMs, driving payment and practice transformation in
commercial insurance, and integrating equity front and center in value-based payment. The goal of a
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sustainable health care system that pays for better quality, equity, and efficiency is both audacious and fully
achievable.
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